• Energy has ceased to be a technical input and has become one of the main weapons of foreign policy.

  • Europe has moved from depending on a supplier with whom it had a conflict of values to depending on a supplier with whom it has a conflict of interests. It is not the same threat, but neither is it energy sovereignty.

  • As for China, Europe cannot rely on the chaos of its rival as its industrial strategy.

  • Demanding that industries produce more here without first solving the cost gap is a mandate with no conditions for compliance.

  • Without a Powered by Europe behind it, Made in Europe is simply a label.

March 6, 2026

The competitiveness of a factory in the Henares Corridor or in Barcelona’s industrial belt is no longer decided solely on its production lines, but in the 33 kilometers of width that separate the coasts of Oman and Iran. This phenomenon, which we could call the glocalization of risk, describes how a regional conflict in the Strait of Hormuz almost instantly becomes a critical variable in the energy management of Spanish industry. In a world where supply chains are exposed nerves, energy has ceased to be a technical input and has become one of the main weapons of foreign policy.

Glocalization: the Strait of Hormuz on the electricity bill

Historically, distant conflicts were perceived as remote noise. Images arrived through television, editorials lamented the situation, and—aside from an occasional spike at the gas pump—European economic life carried on. That perception was already an illusion in 2022, when the cutoff of Russian gas forced the continent to rethink its energy policy from scratch. Today, that illusion has disappeared entirely.

What has changed is not geography, but the architecture of the global economy. Supply chains were woven for years under the premise of maximum efficiency: each component produced where it was cheapest, each route optimized to minimize costs, each energy contract signed in search of the lowest possible price. The result is a system that is extraordinarily efficient but extraordinarily fragile. One fifth of the world’s LNG passes through Hormuz. That 33-kilometer geographic knot conditions the production cost of a chemical plant in Tarragona just as much as that of a steel mill in the Ruhr. Interconnection operates not only through the direct price of energy, but also through more subtle channels: maritime insurance that becomes more expensive or disappears, freight costs that skyrocket, and shipping routes that stretch thousands of miles longer.

For Spain, the immediate impact is smaller than for others: barely 5% of its oil and 2% of its LNG transit that area. But the protection that figure offers is partial. If Asia loses its supply from the Gulf, it will bid for the same Atlantic LNG cargoes that today arrive in the ports of Sagunto or Barcelona. Prices rise for everyone, regardless of where the ship comes from.

United States: strategic partner or Trojan horse?

Washington’s strategy under the Trump administration has been surgical. Before pressing Iran’s “bottleneck,” the United States secured its own backyard with the total blockade of Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro. With its energy sovereignty shielded and having become the world’s leading exporter of LNG (in January, 44% of the LNG imported by Spain came from the United States), Washington can squeeze the Persian bottleneck without putting itself at risk. The United States acts, as it has always acted, according to a logic of absolute national interest. It is not a policy of America First, but—as we previously noted—the philosophy of America Only.

Here arises the reasonable doubt for European industry: Is the United States the partner rescuing us from Russian gas, or a “Trojan horse” making us dependent on its LNG surpluses? Over the past three years, the continent has replaced its dependence on Russian gas with a growing dependence on American LNG, which already represents around 60% of Europe’s liquefied gas imports. The EU–US trade agreement of 2025 included a European commitment to triple its purchases of North American energy. Spain has followed that path: American LNG has gained prominence compared with Algerian pipeline gas, with the advantage of diversification and the disadvantage of a structurally higher price than piped gas.

Diversification is real and it is an achievement. But there is a substantial difference between solving the energy problem and merely moving it elsewhere. Europe has gone from depending on a supplier with whom it had a conflict of values (Russia) to depending on one with whom it has a conflict of interests (the United States). It is not the same threat, but it is not energy sovereignty either. A market that will not hesitate to prioritize its own domestic prices, divert cargoes to Asia if profitability is higher, or use supply as leverage in trade negotiations is not exactly a partner without conditions.

Check to China: energy as an invisible tariff

The collateral target of the pressure on Iran is undoubtedly Beijing. China buys 80% of the crude oil that Iran exports by sea. By controlling or making this flow more expensive, the United States not only attacks Tehran’s finances but also strikes at the waterline of Chinese competitiveness.

The superficial reading is that this benefits Europe: if China pays more for energy, its cost advantage shrinks. That reading is partly correct but incomplete. A China with higher energy costs is also a more desperate competitor, with stronger incentives to flood markets with subsidized products to compensate for its energy bill. It is also a customer that pays more for the raw materials and capital goods Europe exports to it.

What is true is that the shock affects actors asymmetrically, depending on their competitive model. Those who competed exclusively on price—betting that their production cost would always be lower than their rivals’—are hit harder than those who had invested in technological differentiation or quality. In that sense, a sustained energy disruption could partially rebalance the competitiveness gap. But Europe cannot rely on the chaos of its rival as its industrial strategy.

Made in Europe: shield or noose?

In this scenario of “ordered chaos,” the College of Commissioners gave the green light to the new European industrial regulation: the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), also known as “Made in Europe”.  The regulation introduces European origin quotas in public procurement (steel, aluminum, cement, electric vehicles), strict conditions on foreign investment in strategic sectors, and the creation of industrial zones with accelerated permitting procedures. The stated objective is for manufacturing to reach 20% of European GDP within a decade. It is a bold and well-oriented step. But it has an internal contradiction that the institutional debate has avoided naming clearly.

The risk is that these local-content requirements and decarbonization mandates become a noose rather than a shield if they are not accompanied by affordable and stable electricity. The sectors that Made in Europe demands to produce more locally are precisely those with the most severe energy problem: steel, aluminum, cement, chemicals. These are energy-intensive industries that consume 60% of Europe’s manufacturing energy and have spent years competing at a disadvantage against producers in third countries with access to cheaper energy and fewer regulatory emission requirements. Demanding that these industries produce more locally without first solving that cost gap is a mandate without conditions for compliance.

There is no Made in Europe without Powered by Europe

The current crisis is not a repetition of 2022, but the end of the era of cheap, consequence-free globalized energy. Energy management in industry can no longer be treated as a cost to minimize, but as a sovereignty asset that defines competitiveness.

Made in Europe is the necessary response to a world that no longer plays by the rules of free trade but by those of national security. But for it to work, Europe—and Spain with it—must understand that there is no industry without competitive energy. Put differently: without a Powered by Europe behind it, Made in Europe is simply a label.

Energy sovereignty is not a state achieved through a regulation; it is a process built kilowatt by kilowatt, contract by contract, investment decision by investment decision. The wolf’s ears have been getting longer for years. The difference between those who survive this industrial decade and those who do not will lie in how many decided to see them—and act—before the wolf arrived.